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HOW MUCH DO WE REALLY KNOW
ABOUT CRIMINAL DETERRENCE?
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER*
This Article discusses the deterrence of crime through sanctions. It
begins with a brief intellectual history of deterrence theory in the work of
Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, two Enlightenment philosophers
who created the conceptual foundation for later deterrence and rational
choice theory. Although a prominent intellectual current by the end of the
1700s, interest in deterrence and rational choice based theories of criminal
offending was later eclipsed by more biologically and psychologically
based explanations. Interest in deterrence theory and the deterrent effect of
legal sanctions was not rekindled until the mid-1960s. This Article
discusses the particular and important role of the Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology in publishing the works of both those who were highly
critical of deterrence theory and those who wished to keep it alive, though
vividly aware of the lack of any empirical support for it. This Article
discusses the theoretical connections that are presumed by the deterrence
process and briefly reviews some important empirical studies pertaining to
each of those presumed causal connections. The empirical evidence leads
to the conclusion that there is a marginal deterrent effect for legal
sanctions, but this conclusion must be swallowed with a hefty dose of
caution and skepticism; it is very difficult to state with any precision how
strong a deterrent effect the criminal justice system provides. At the very
least, there is a great asymmetry between what is expected of the legal
system through deterrence and what the system delivers. There is greater
confidence that non-legal factors are more effective in securing compliance
than legal threats. It is argued that the empirical evidence does support the
belief that criminal offenders are rational actors, in that they are
responsive to the incentives and disincentives associated with their actions,
but that the criminal justice system, because of its delayed imposition of
punishment, is not well constructed to exploit this rationality.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of deterrence is quite simple—it is the omission of a
criminal act because of the fear of sanctions or punishment. While not the
entire premise, deterrence is certainly an important foundation of the
criminal justice system. Law enforcement exists both to apprehend
wrongdoers and to convince would-be wrongdoers that there is a risk of
apprehension and punishment if they commit a crime. Laws that provide a
host of different sanctions for the commission of criminal offenses (fines,
probation, imprisonment) serve notice that criminal statutes contain a
credible threat that—it is hoped—will inhibit those who have been
punished from committing additional crimes (specific deterrence) and those
who have not yet offended from committing crimes at all (general
deterrence).
Particular criminal justice policies such as police
“crackdowns,” enhanced enforcement in and surveillance of high crime
areas or “hot spots,” mandatory minimum sentences, sentencing
enhancements for firearm possession, “three-strike” laws, and others are all
enacted with the expectation that they will successfully engineer the crime
rate down through deterring offenders and would-be offenders. It is
reasonable to argue that a belief or expectation that sanction threats can
deter crime is at the very heart of the criminal justice system.
In spite of its central importance, and the very high expectation we
have that legal punishment and criminal justice policies can inhibit crime,
we do not have very solid and credible empirical evidence that deterrence
through the imposition of criminal sanctions works very well. While we
have an abundance of research about specific police, judicial, and
correctional policies, as well as more general theoretical work about
deterrence mechanisms, the evidence to date, while suggesting that there is
a deterrence return to all that we do about crime, is more than a little flimsy.
In essence, while we can say that there likely is a deterrent effect to the
workings of the criminal justice system, 1 it is difficult to determine how
strong an effect it is and why that effect is not stronger than we might think
it should be. This Article explores at least two very important reasons why
the empirical evidence in support of criminal deterrence is so weak: (1) it is
1
It is easy enough to see that criminal deterrence frequently and effectively influences
our actions. We all “throw out the anchor” on the highway when we spot a patrol car. We
generally do not park in handicapped-only parking spots. We do not light up a joint at the
movies. Burglars like to break into unoccupied homes. Drug deals are typically made in the
shadows and not out in the open where police can see. But while we know that deterrence
works in the absence of doing nothing about crime, we are decidedly less certain about
relative or marginal deterrent effects. For example, does increasing the number of police
officers reduce crime? Does adding three years to a prison sentence for the use of a gun
deter firearm-related felonies? Does an increased use of incarceration deter crime better
compared with previous levels of incarceration?
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very difficult to isolate and measure a deterrent effect precisely because a
great many things must happen before deterrence can occur; (2) it just may
be very difficult to generate strong deterrent effects through the legal
system because the system is unable to exploit human rationality
effectively. This Article examines selective features of the empirical
deterrence terrain (more comprehensive reviews of the literature are both
abundant and recent) with the intention of providing a glimpse of what we
know about criminal deterrence and how our knowledge is very imprecise,
how difficult it is to come by that knowledge, and what features of the legal
system and its delivery of sanctions, and of people may contribute to our
lack of precise knowledge about deterrence.
The Article begins with a brief intellectual history of deterrence and
the role of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology in that history.
The following section discusses the causal mechanisms that define how the
process of deterrence works. This causal process links the workings of the
criminal justice system (the objective properties of punishment) to the
perceptual properties of punishment held by individuals to crime and, in
turn, both of these properties of punishment to crime. A causal effect of
deterrence requires that each of the three links in this chain be present.
Subsequent sections briefly review selected empirical studies about each
one of the necessary causal connections in deterrence. The Article
concludes with a more speculative discussion about what it is about the
criminal justice system and about human beings that contributes to the
generally weak, generally imprecise empirical support for criminal
deterrence through legal sanctions.
II. A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF DETERRENCE
THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY
A. INTELLECTUAL ROOTS

There are two standard, but nonetheless productive, sources to consult
for an understanding of the intellectual history of deterrence theory. The
first is an essay, On Crimes and Punishments (On Crimes), written in 1764
by the Enlightenment philosopher Cesare Beccaria,2 and the second is
Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (Introduction to the Principles), published in 1789. 3 Although
Beccaria is often cited as the founder of the classical school of criminology,

2

CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., Macmillan
1986) (1764).
3
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books
1988) (1789).
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On Crimes does not really contain a fully developed theory of crime as
much as Bentham’s does. Beccaria’s On Crimes is best thought of as a
collection of principles that an enlightened ruler might use to make the
administration of his legal system more systematically rational and
therefore, Beccaria would argue, efficient.4 Nevertheless, the essay does
contain discussions about the characteristics of punishment that form the
foundation of deterrence theory. 5 Bentham’s Introduction to the Principles
contains a more fully articulated theory of crime that provides a better
foundation for a rational choice theory of crime. 6
On Crimes begins by clearly describing Beccaria’s purpose—not to
question authority, but to make the exercise of authority more rational:
Whoever might wish to honor me with his criticism should therefore begin by
understanding clearly the design of this work, a design which, far from diminishing
legitimate authority, must serve to increase it, if reasoning rather than force can
prevail among men, and if benevolence and humanity justify it in the eyes of all. 7

Becarria was an Enlightenment thinker who was repulsed by the cruelty and
barbarism of the legal codes under the anciens regimes throughout Europe. 8
These codes allowed such practices as secret accusations, torture,
convictions without trial, and a host of not only cruel but disparate
punishments. 9 These practices were offensive to Beccaria because their
irrationality made them ineffective for crime control. 10 What Beccaria
proposed in their place was a corpus of principles for authorities to follow
that would make their rule more rational and, therefore, more effective. 11
He proposed a system of legal reforms that included clearly written laws, a
restrained judiciary, the abolishment of torture and secret accusations, and a
proportionality between the harm produced by the crime and the amount of
punishment visited upon the offender. 12
Becarria argued that the motivation to commit crime was found in
ubiquitous self-interest, which he referred to as “the despotic spirit[] which
is in every man,” 13 and that the “tangible motives”14 to commit crime had to
be countered by punishments. But the power of the sovereign is not
4

See BECCARIA, supra note 2.
Id. at 10-13.
6
BENTHAM, supra note 3.
7
BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 4.
8
Id. at 3-4.
9
See id. at 17-20, 25-28.
10
Id. at 8-9.
11
Id. at 17-19.
12
Id. at 93-99.
13
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
14
Id.
5
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limitless; instead, the authority of the sovereign is premised on the consent
of the governed—the social contract in Enlightenment terms—wherein each
person surrenders only a limited part of his or her freedom in exchange for
protection against others who would harm him or her. 15 In Chapter 23 of
On Crimes, Beccaria argued that punishment must be proportionate to the
crime: crimes that cause the greatest damage to society should be punished
the most severely, and the least serious crimes should result in the least
painful punishments. 16
Even before this, however, Beccaria presented (in Chapter 20) a
proposition that has been axiomatic in deterrence theory ever since. Certain
punishment is a much more effective deterrent than severe punishment:
One of the greatest curbs on crimes is not the cruelty of punishments, but their
infallibility . . . . The certainty of a punishment, even if it be moderate, will always
make a stronger impression than the fear of another which is more terrible but
combined with the hope of impunity; even the least evils, when they are certain,
17
always terrify men’s minds . . . .

He argued that punishments that are certain, severe enough to
sufficiently offset the anticipated gains of crime, and arrive immediately
after the crime would make for a more effective legal system than the
system that existed at the time, which combined great cruelty and the
seemingly random exercise of mercy. 18 Very much the original deterrence
theorist, Beccaria’s position was that the self-interest to commit crime has
to be thwarted by legal punishment that is certain, proportional, and swift. 19
In the penultimate chapter of On Crimes, Beccaria made an interesting
observation that is returned to at the end of this Article. Chapter 41 is
entitled “How to Prevent Crimes,” and Beccaria began this chapter with the
observation that “[i]t is better to prevent crimes that to punish them.” 20 Of
course, the reader could not be blamed for thinking that after forty chapters
he had already fully explained how crimes can be prevented—crime can be
deterred by the threats provided by a rational and efficient legal system of
punishment, the structure of which makes up the first forty chapters of On
Crimes. While Beccaria believed, without a doubt, that clearly defined laws
that enjoy a great deal of consensus, are enforced equally, and are
associated with certain and measured punishment could secure compliance,
he also seemed keenly aware of the limitations of the legal system in the

15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 62-64.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 46-47, 55-57, 62-64.
Id. at 93.
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prevention of most crime. 21 He argued that “the surest but most difficult
way to prevent crimes is by perfecting education,” by which he meant
moral education or self-restraint—education on virtue. 22 Education allows
individuals to avoid evil by enabling them to make better choices rather
than securing their compliance through punishment, “which obtains only
simulated and momentary obedience.”23 In terms of creating the conditions
for maximum freedom and minimum evil (by both crime and punishment),
Beccaria, in the end, seemed to appeal more to Rousseau’s Emile 24 than to
Bentham’s Panopticon. 25
While On Crimes provides the enlightened authority with practical
policies to make legal systems more rational and efficient, it is thin with
respect to any developed theory of crime or criminal conduct. Beccaria
provided no real theory of behavior other than that crime is driven by selfinterest, which resides in everyone. Bentham, however, offered a more
developed intellectual source for deterrence theory’s model of human
conduct. It is in Bentham where one finds the notion of utility as the
weighted balance between two opposing considerations—pleasure
(benefits) and pain (costs)—that is the guide to conduct. 26 In the very first
paragraph of Introduction to the Principles, Bentham argued that human
behavior is directed by the twin goals of the attainment of pleasure and the
avoidance of pain: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of
two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out
what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.” 27 The
“masters” of pleasure and pain operate through the principle of utility—
actions that bring pleasure provide utility, and those that bring pain provide
disutility. The happiness of the individual is maximized when the sum total
of their actions brings them more utility than disutility, and the selfinterested individual is presumed to behave in such a way as to maximize
his individual utility. 28 In talking about the general inclination to action in
later chapters of Introduction to the Principles, Bentham stated in
Chapter 3:
Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on
the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of

21

Id. at 93-99.
Id. at 98.
23
Id. at 99.
24
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE: OR ON EDUCATION (Dartmouth Coll. Press 2010)
(1762).
25
JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON (1787).
26
BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 1.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 31.
22
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the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the
29
side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole.

In Chapter 7, he explained that “[t]he general tendency of an act is
more or less pernicious, according to the sum total of its consequences: that
is, according to the difference between the sum of such as are good, and the
sum of such as are evil.” 30 Utility for individuals, then, is the net difference
between the benefits and costs of actions; among alternative courses of
action, the individual will choose that which has the greater sum of benefits
over costs.
In subsequent chapters, Bentham discussed the characteristics of
pleasure and pain and, in the process, developed a theory much broader in
scope than a strict version of deterrence theory31—a theory that resembles
what a century later would be called rational choice theory in
criminology. 32 He stated in Chapter 3 that there are four general sources of
pleasure and pain: (1) physical, (2) political, (3) moral or popular, and (4)
religious. 33 With respect to crime, an example of physical pleasure would
be the feeling of exhilaration or “high” one gets from using drugs; an
example of physical pain would be getting shot by a homeowner when
trying to break into her house at night. Political pain would include the
stock of legal sanctions used by authorities. Examples of the moral or
popular pleasure and pain of criminal conduct include, respectively, the
sense of prestige and reputation that one might get from some as a result of
being involved in crime and the blast of censure and approbation received
from more conventional others. Religious pleasure consists of the sense of
a rewarded afterlife for good conduct, and the pain consists of the
anticipation of damnation.
As one can see, in discussing this very diverse variety of pleasures and
pains that ultimately determine the utility of one’s actions, Bentham
developed a substantially more general theory of behavior in Introduction
to the Principles than Beccaria did in On Crimes. In addition to the pains
presented by legal punishments, Bentham’s theory includes a host of
informal sanctions, imposed by the self and social others, in addition to a
wide consideration of the specific pleasures that can be experienced by
criminal behavior not under the direct control of legal authorities.34 In
addition to the different types or sources of pain and pleasure, Bentham
29

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 70.
31
See generally id. at 97-130.
32
See generally THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES
OFFENDING (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986).
33
BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 25.
34
See id. at 24-42.
30

ON
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argued that there is an important variation in several characteristics—or
their elements or dimensions—including intensity, duration, certainty,
propinquity, fecundity, and purity. 35 Later, in Chapter 5 of Introduction to
the Principles, Bentham provided a comprehensive list of the specific kinds
of pleasures (the pleasures of the senses, a good reputation, wealth) and
pains (physical pains, being poor, having an ill reputation).36 At the end of
Chapter 5, Bentham remarked, with respect to crime specifically, that the
inclination to offend consists of a desire to attain the above pleasures and
avoid the pains and that the punishment of the offender is inflicted, and is
justified in being inflicted, by imposing one or more of the pains.37 Finally,
while it is clear that he had no well-developed understanding of
psychology, in Chapter 6 Bentham implied that the pleasures and pains that
are the important determinants of utility, and therefore behavior, are those
that are seen by the individual and not necessarily those that objectively
exist: “[p]ain and pleasure are produced in men’s minds by the action of
certain causes. But the quantity of pleasure and pain runs not uniformly in
proportion to the cause; in other words, to the quantity of force exerted by
such cause.” 38
In spite of what (for the times) was a fairly well-developed theory that
explained the cause of crime, what the reaction or response to crime should
be, and how those reactions or responses should be apportioned, when the
profession of criminology initially developed, it did not build its foundation
upon the works of either Beccaria or Bentham, but on the
biological/psychological model of psychiatrists like Pinel, Pritchard, and
Rush, who all believed that criminal behavior was more likely to be the
result of a pathological mind than anything else and that such a pathology
affected only a minority of persons. 39 From an early emphasis on
criminality due to individual conditions, such as moral insanity, it was but a
short-step to criminal anthropologists’ concepts of atavism, degeneration,
and feeble-mindedness. 40 This movement of the study of crime from the
more philosophical works of Beccaria and Bentham to biological positivism
was due to several sources including the growing influence of natural
science (Darwin’s On the Origin of Species was published in 185941), the
prestige of the medical profession, and the political advantages of a view of
35

Id. at 29-32.
Id. at 33-42.
37
Id. at 41.
38
Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
39
NICOLE RAFTER, THE CRIMINAL BRAIN: UNDERSTANDING BIOLOGICAL THEORIES
CRIME 19-21 (2008).
40
Id. at 65-70.
41
CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Penguin 2003) (1859).
36

OF
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crime that attributed its causes to individual pathology rather than some
defect of the political or social system. 42 Whatever the appeal of the
biological positivists, criminology would turn its back for nearly two
centuries on deterrence theory, as well as the more general idea that the
motivation to commit crime was something that everyone possessed and
that crime, like any other human activity, was rational and motivated by
considerations of utility.
B. RESURRECTION OF DETERRENCE THEORY

Over the years, the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
(Journal) has played a prominent role in both helping to bury deterrence
theory and later reviving it. The general ill-repute in which deterrence
theory was held in the field of criminology before the mid-twentieth century
was nicely captured in an article by Hans von Hentig that appeared in the
Journal in 1938.43 Von Hentig, a former associate editor of the Journal,
argued that there are large groups of persons who are simply immune to the
deterrence-like threats of the law including those motivated by love or
maternal instincts, the young and women who tend to be impetuous, those
motivated by ideology, the “have-nots,” and the feeble-minded. 44
According to von Hentig, Bentham’s belief that persons are moved by the
consequences of their actions, the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain,
“appear[s] to be unreal and simple-minded, when we think of the enormous
multiformity and complication of life.”45 To von Hentig, as to most
criminologists at the time and even later, something so complicated and
serious as crime requires an equally complicated and serious answer.46
These criminologists believed that, in order to deal with crime on the policy
level, one must first take a comprehensive study of the individual offender
to discover what factors or forces are operating to produce him. Only
through the scientific study of the individual offender can we develop a
sense of the complex causal factors in crime, which is necessary before we
can begin to deal with them. In making a more general criticism of
deterrence theory, von Hentig made a very insightful point that is returned
to in the conclusion of this Article. According to von Hentig, deterrence is
doomed to fail because the pleasure of committing a criminal act is a “near
object” while the cost provided by the legal system is a “long-distance
42
IAN TAYLOR, PAUL WALTON & JOCK YOUNG, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL
THEORY OF DEVIANCE 38-40 (1973).
43
Hans von Hentig, The Limits of Deterrence, 29 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
555 (1938).
44
Id. at 557-60.
45
Id. at 560.
46
Id. at 561.
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danger,” very much in the remote future and therefore unable to offset the
more immediate advantages of crime. 47
Two other articles in the Journal made arguments conceptually similar
to von Hentig’s that were in opposition to the use of punishment to deter
wrongdoing and secure compliance with rules. In his article entitled “Is
Punishment Necessary?,” Jackson Toby took a position that was
characteristic of many criminologists and sociologists of his time. 48
According to Toby, the use of punishment to create conformity through
deterrence is not necessary because “[t]he socialization process prevents
most deviant behavior. . . [and] [o]nly the unsocialized (and therefore
amoral) individual fits the model of classical criminology and is deterred
from expressing deviant impulses by a nice calculation of pleasures and
While punishment in the Durkheimian sense of
punishments.” 49
strengthening the moral convictions of citizens is necessary, punishment in
order to deter cannot hold much promise. 50 Much the same position was
taken from a psychological perspective just one year later by James B.
Appel and Neil J. Peterson. 51 They argued that psychological learning
principles are inconsistent with the idea that punishment could inhibit
behavior under normal circumstances.52 To be effective, they argued,
deterrence requires either extreme (and likely cruel) forms of punishment or
repeated applications of punishment.53 In the full spirit of the reigning
rehabilitative model of the time, Appel and Peterson concluded that
punishment is “essentially an ineffective way to control or to eliminate the
behavior of the punished person.” 54
Although adherents were certainly in the minority, not all scholars
were dismissive of deterrence theory. In fact, three articles published in the
Journal were instrumental in keeping the deterrence doctrine intellectually
alive until it could be fully revived in the late 1960s. The first of these was
by Johannes Andenaes. The Journal published his ultimately influential
article in 1952, almost two decades after von Hentig’s and in the midst of
the popularity of the medical model of deviance and the rehabilitation

47

Id. at 559 (emphasis omitted).
Jackson Toby, Is Punishment Necessary?, 55 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
332 (1964).
49
Id. at 333 (citing ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 89 (1947)).
50
Id. at 333-34.
51
James B. Appel & Neil J. Peterson, What’s Wrong with Punishment?, 56 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 450 (1965).
52
Id. at 452-53.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 453.
48
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model of corrections. 55 In his article, Andenaes argued for what he called
the “general preventive effect of punishment.” 56 The general preventive
effect of punishment includes general deterrence but is much broader than
that, also including the moralizing effect that punishment may have and its
effect in creating a habit of conformity. 57 Andenaes’s perspective was
distinctive, however, in its stance against the prevailing popular and
scientific winds as embodied in the assertion that punishment could play an
important role in securing compliance.58 He acknowledged that the
consideration of the general preventive effects of punishment had, over the
years, taken a back seat to the individual preventive effects. 59 The
individual preventive effects of punishment include rehabilitation or
reformation of the offender as well as incapacitation and specific
deterrence.60 Andenaes also asserted that at least one of the reasons why
punishment for general preventive effects was not more popular within the
scientific and policy communities was because there was not a sound
empirical basis for the proposition that punishment had general deterrent,
moralizing, or habituating effects:
These views on the relationship between general prevention and the magnitude of
punishment are built upon abstract reasoning . . . . It must be admitted at once that
only very little support for the proposition is to be educed from experience—in the
first place because the general-preventive effect is always hard to ascertain, and
second because there has never been a systematic gathering of material which could
61
illuminate the question.

At the conclusion of his article, Andenaes simply noted that “the
empirical data are still lacking . . . [and] we shall not have firm ground to
stand on before a systematic investigation is made into the effect of penal
law and its enforcement on the citizen’s behavior.”62
To get a sense of the resistance to Andenaes’s efforts to bring forward
a discussion of the role of punishment in deterrence in the existing
intellectual current of the time, the American Catholic Sociological Review
published a review of his article wherein the reviewer noted that
Andenaes’s “approach, which talks of eliminating crime by means of more
effective law enforcement and heavier penalties, is at first repugnant to the

55
Johs Andenaes, General Prevention—Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176 (1952).
56
Id. at 177.
57
Id. at 179.
58
Id. at 179-180.
59
Id. at 175.
60
Id. at 180.
61
Id. at 193.
62
Id. at 197.
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democratic citizen and smacks of the police state.” 63 The reviewer
acknowledged that Andenaes may have had a point about the moralizing
effects of punishment, but that “the empirical data on crime prevention are
still lacking.” 64
The review of Andenaes’s article was followed just two years later by
an article by John Ball in the Journal entitled “The Deterrence Concept in
Criminology and Law.” 65 Ball too was clearly aware of the fact that most
criminologists thought that punishment is archaic and barbaric, that crime is
really due to some underlying individual pathology, and that the only way
to reduce it is through the rehabilitation of individual offenders.66 As a
result of this concern with reformation, most scholars either ignored
deterrence theory or “incorrectly and prematurely dismissed [it] as
invalid.” 67 Ball’s point, much like Andenaes’s, was that rather than dismiss
deterrence on ideological grounds, there needed to be empirical research
conducted so that a scientific evaluation of the theory could be
undertaken. 68 Ball went much farther than simply lamenting the absence of
an existing empirical foundation for deterrence theory; he articulated a
comprehensive research agenda. Two very critical points in that agenda
were that it is very likely that any empirical deterrent effect for punishment
(1) depends upon the certainty of punishment, and (2) requires an
understanding of would-be offenders’ perceptions of punishment rather
than the objective properties of punishment. 69 As Ball wrote, “A law can
have no deterrent influence upon a potential criminal if he is unaware of its
existence.” 70 These two points would play an important role in the
subsequent development of deterrence theory.
In 1965, the Journal published the third important article pertaining to
deterrence theory; C. Ray Jeffery, who was at the time the Editor of the
Journal’s Book Review section, penned the article. 71 Entitled “Criminal
63
Joseph G. Green, Jr., Periodical Review, 14 AM. CATHOLIC SOC. REV. 57, 57 (1953).
(reviewing Andenaes, supra note 55).
64
Id.
65
John C. Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347 (1955).
66
Id. at 347-48.
67
Id. at 348.
68
See Andenaes, supra note 55.
69
Ball, supra note 65, at 351.
70
Id.
71
C. R. Jeffery, Criminal Behavior and Learning Theory, 56 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 294, 294 (1965). A paper by Schmideberg published in the Journal five years
before Jeffery’s also presented a staunch defense for the use of punishment for deterrent
purposes. Melitta Schmideberg, The Offender’s Attitude Toward Punishment, 51 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 328 (1960).
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Behavior and Learning Theory,” the article’s primary focus was the
author’s interest in crafting a learning theory of criminal behavior that drew
upon the work of Edwin Sutherland and B. F. Skinner. 72 Since punishment
is an integral part of operant learning theory, Jeffery spent some time
discussing its role in criminal behavior.73 He argued that the experimental
evidence that was accumulating in psychology supported the position that
punishment (or at least its certainty) can play a constructive role in deterring
criminal behavior. 74 There are, however, three features about legal
punishment that prevent it from being an even more effective deterrent:
(1) legal punishments are generally very uncertain, (2) they are only
imposed long after the crime has been committed and so have low celerity,
and (3) the pleasures of crime are immediate and so carry greater weight
than the delayed costs of crime in the would-be offender’s calculus. 75 In a
point that is returned to at the end of this Article, Jeffery noted that an
unfortunate feature of punishment and criminal behavior is that “[t]here are
no aversive stimuli in the environment at that moment.” 76
C. MODERN REVIVAL OF DETERRENCE THEORY

Although the classical school’s advocacy of deterrence theory had
come dangerously close to being scientifically discredited and the best that
one could say of it was that it was politely ignored by both academics and
penal reformers, it continued to have its group of supporters. Influential
articles published in the Journal and a few other social scientific journals
and law reviews kept the belief in the deterrent effect of punishment alive,
if only on life-support. 77 Rejection of the deterrence doctrine seemed to be
based more upon ideological than empirical grounds as both friend and foe
of deterrence noted that the empirical base was exceedingly thin. 78
In spite of the neglect and criticism heaped upon deterrence theory by
generations of criminologists and other scholars interested in crime, two
articles appeared in 1968 that revived interest in deterrence theory—one by
72
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an economist and one by a sociologist. The article by economist Gary
Becker was premised on an understanding of crime that was similar to
Bentham’s, 79 while sociologist Jack P. Gibbs’s article drew more from
Beccaria. 80 Both articles ignited great interest in empirically testing some
of the hypotheses of deterrence theory. After Gibbs’s and Becker’s articles,
there were scores of empirical studies of the effect of sanctions and sanction
threats, and that scholarly effort continues to the present day. 81 At long last,
the battle between deterrence and other possible state responses to crime
was waged, at least in part, on empirical grounds.
Becker made an explicit point of rejecting existing theories of crime
that presumed that offenders possess some sort of extraordinary motivation
based upon strain or psychological abnormalities and, instead, argued that
crime was due to rational self-interest and could be understood like any
other kind of economic activity: “[A] useful theory of criminal behavior can
dispense with special theories of anomie, psychological inadequacies, or
inheritance of special traits and simply extend the economist’s usual
analysis of choice.” 82 The economist’s “usual analysis of choice” was a
rational choice model of criminal behavior that
assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected utility to them exceeds the
utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities . . . . Some
persons become “criminals,” therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from
83
that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ.

Becker argued that, in the expected utility model, the decision to offend is
made up of the costs and benefits of both crime and non-crime. 84 The costs
include the formal legal punishments available for a crime, and Becker
noted that the certainty of legal penalties are more important than their
severity. 85 Though obviously less sophisticated than Becker, Bentham’s
theory of crime contained many of the same principles: criminal behavior
requires no special motivation; behavior is a product of the utility of
actions; the utility of an action is the net difference between the benefits and

79
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 170 (1968).
80
Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SOUTHWESTERN SOC. SCI. Q.
515, 515-16 (1968).
81
See generally JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975);
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME
CONTROL (1973); Nagin, supra note 77; Paternoster, supra note 77.
82
Becker, supra note 79, at 170.
83
Id. at 176.
84
Id. at 177-78.
85
Id. at 178.

2010]

CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

779

costs of that action; other things being equal, the action with the greatest
utility will be selected among alternatives.86
Gibbs’s article that same year was much more Beccarian in that it
focused exclusively on the role of punishment in criminal behavior and
adopted a specific theory of criminal deterrence by legal sanctions rather
than the more general expected utility theories of Bentham and Becker. 87
Gibbs was less interested in discussing notions of utility and the diverse
benefits and costs of crime than he was in the more specific question of
whether or not actual punishment, implemented by authorities, was
effective in reducing crime. Gibbs also initiated an agenda of empirical
research on the subject—something that had been missing throughout the
previous two centuries—that examined the relationship between the
certainty and severity of punishment in individual states and their crime
rates. 88 The importance of Gibbs’s article is that it provided an empirical
example of how deterrence research could be done, and his finding of an
inverse relationship between the certainty of punishment in a state and the
homicide rate provided some support for those who believed that there was
something to the deterrence argument.
Gibbs created convincing
operational definitions of the certainty and severity of punishment for
homicide across the several states and argued that if the deterrence doctrine
was valid, then states where the certainty and severity of punishment were
higher would have lower homicide rates.89 This is precisely what he found,
providing empirical evidence that perhaps punishment is effective in
generating compliance with the laws.90 Gibbs’s confirmation of general
deterrence initiated a veritable cottage industry of deterrence research
among sociologists and criminologists. 91 Subsequent research examined
the deterrence of crimes other than homicide, entertained new measures of
the certainty and severity of punishment, and pursued nagging
methodological issues such as possible feedback effects between crime and
punishment. 92 By the early to mid-1970s, empirical and theoretical work in
deterrence was a vibrant field, and the publication of two important books,
Zimring and Hawkins’s Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control

86

See generally BENTHAM, supra note 3.
Gibbs, supra note 80.
88
Id. at 523-25.
89
Id. at 519-20.
90
Id. at 524-25.
91
For descriptions of this research, see GIBBS, supra note 81; ZIMRING & HAWKINS,
supra note 81; Nagin, supra note 77.
92
Paternoster, supra note 77. See generally Nagin, supra note 77.
87

780

RAYMOND PATERNOSTER

[Vol. 100

and Gibbs’s Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, greatly helped to solidify
interest in deterrence. 93
Two important theoretical developments in deterrence work occurred
later in the mid-1980s. One development was that scholars began to
understand deterrence theory as a theory about the perception of sanction
threats and the relationship between those perceptions and self-reported
behavior. 94 This stood in contrast to research and theorizing from the mid1960s to the late 1970s, which mainly dealt with the objective properties of
punishment. 95 The charge began when Geerken and Gove developed a
perceptual theory of deterrence,96 after which scholars began to understand
deterrence as a social psychological theory of threat communication and to
realize that if the objective properties of punishment are important, it is only
The
because they affect crime through individual perceptions. 97
restatement of deterrence as a perceptual theory, and therefore a theory at
the individual or micro-level, led to another outpouring of deterrence
research that began in the mid-1970s and continues to the present day. 98
In addition to a conception of deterrence that emphasized a perceptual
dimension, a second important theoretical development in deterrence theory
occurred in the mid-1980s. Traditionally, deterrence theory had been
restricted to the proposition that the imposition or the threat of the
imposition of formal legal sanctions was related to crime. 99 The definition
of deterrence provided by Gibbs is a perfect example of this: “Deterrence
can be thought of as the omission of an act as a response to the perceived
risk and fear of punishment for contrary behavior. Since the deterrence
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doctrine focuses on crime, the acts in question are violations of criminal
laws and the punishments are ‘legal.’” 100
Later, the conceptual boundaries of deterrence theory were gradually
expanded. In 1986, Williams and Hawkins argued that any inhibition of
crime that was brought about directly or indirectly by the threat of legal
sanctions should be considered part of the deterrence process. 101 They drew
a distinction between punishment that is based upon the criminal act itself
and punishment that is based upon any legal reaction to the criminal act. 102
For example, if I refrain from drinking and driving because I fear that my
spouse will think less of me if she finds out that I have been drinking and
driving, my inhibition is not due to deterrence but to an extralegal process
(social censure or embarrassment). However, if I refrain from drinking and
driving because I fear that if I am arrested my spouse will think less of me
because of the arrest, then since her disapproval is triggered by the arrest
and not the act itself, my avoidance of drinking and driving is to be
considered an instance of deterrence. Williams and Hawkins essentially
added a new cluster of right-hand-side variables to the deterrence equation
so that it included inhibition due to the threat of legal punishment, and
inhibition due to the threat of social censure, commitment costs (fear of
losing my job if arrested), and any self-imposed costs (guilt if I were
arrested).
Around the same time, rational choice models of crime were being
developed in criminology, 103 and these models were decidedly inspired by
both Bentham and Becker in that they included the full range of anticipated
benefits and costs of crime. 104 In content they were very much what
Bentham described, and they were called subjective expected utility models
because they were predicated on the perceived or subjectively understood
costs and benefits of criminal offending, 105 something that Ball argued for
three decades earlier in the Journal. 106 At this point, a pure deterrence
model was blended into a more general rational choice model of crime in
which anticipated legal costs are simply one of several factors considered
by rational and reasoning would-be offenders.
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With this basic history of deterrence theory completed, the next section
provides a summary of the major hypotheses and research questions posed
by the theory. This is followed by a brief examination of the existing
empirical support for each of the hypotheses.
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DETERRENCE THEORY
Deterrence theory is a theory of crime that presumes that human
beings are rational enough to consider the consequences of their actions and
to be influenced by those consequences.107 Generally, as self-interested and
relatively free agents, human beings are influenced by the benefits and costs
of their actions. Virtually any human activity can be understood as
resulting in both benefits and costs, and persons are presumed to be rational
enough to weigh the costs and benefits of any action and any reasonable
alternative courses of action. The behavior with the greatest advantage of
benefits over costs (the one resulting in greater utility) is presumed to be the
behavior with the highest probability of being acted upon. Deterrence
theorists presume, therefore, that human beings are self-interested, rational,
and reasoning creatures. 108 An implication of this view is that an innate
propensity to commit crime is not possessed by some people but not by
others (the Positive School’s notion of “differentiation” between criminals
and non-criminals) 109 but instead resides in everyone.110 Since we are all
motivated by self-interest, we all have the capacity to commit crime when
the benefits of crime exceed the costs. Similarly, we are all motivated to go
to college or get married if the benefits of post-secondary education and
marriage are thought to be greater than the costs. In other words, crime is
no different than other behavior and criminals are no different than noncriminals—what differs across people are their assessments of the costs and
benefits of different lines of action.111
As a human activity, crime comes with its own stock of benefits and
costs. As suggested above, the decision to commit crime is no different
than the decision to go to college or to get married—it is made by
reasonable, rational agents who are self-interested and select behaviors that
provide more rewards than costs. This means that crime does not have to
be explained by any extraordinary motivation—or any motivation at all—
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other than self-interest. 112 Most of the time, people are not compelled to
commit criminal acts 113 but do so when the expected benefits outweigh the
expected gains. A key term in deterrence theory, therefore, is the notion of
utility, which simply refers to the total satisfaction that is derived from a
course of action or consumption. 114 A very simple equation to express the
basic premise of deterrence theory is that an individual will decide to offend
if:
U(Crime) = p 1 (Benefits of Crime) + p 2 (Costs of Crime)
+ p 3 (Benefits of Non-Crime) + p 4 (Costs of Non-Crime)

(1.1)

This equation states that the utility of crime is equal to the sum of the
benefits of crime (easy money, the “high” of drug use, prestige, or “rep”),
the costs of crime (getting arrested, getting convicted, going to jail, loss of
family respect, not seeing one’s children while in jail or prison), the
benefits of non-crime (a steady and safe income from a job, physical
security from not being shot or falling ill from ingesting bad drugs), and the
costs of non-crime (low wages, feeling like a failure from a low-prestige
job). The p’s reflect the probability of each event occurring. The utility of
crime, then, is determined not only by the outcomes, but by the probability
of those outcomes.
One of the costs of crime is the possible legal punishment, including
being arrested for committing the act, getting convicted of the crime, and
being subjected to some kind of punishment as a result of conviction (jail,
probation, prison, or, in some jurisdictions for some crimes, death).
Deterrence theorists presume that punishment by the legal system will
increase the cost of—and therefore inhibit—crime. 115 There are three
properties of legal punishment that are related to its cost, the (1) certainty,
(2) severity, and (3) celerity (or swiftness) of punishment. Other things
being equal, a legal punishment is more costly when it is more certain
(more likely than not to be a consequence of crime), severe (greater in
magnitude), and swift (the punishment arrives sooner rather than later after
the offense). This leads to the three key hypotheses that can be deduced
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from deterrence theory, which have served to guide empirical research over
the past fifty years: 116
H 1 : The greater the certainty of legal punishment, the lower the crime rate.
H 2 : The greater the severity of legal punishment, the lower the crime rate.
H 3 : The greater the celerity of legal punishment, the lower the crime rate.

The important deterrence variables are, then, certainty, severity, and
celerity. There are two levels of these punishment properties, an objective
level and a subjective (or perceptual) level. In general, the criminal justice
system is premised in part on the expectation that having rigorously
enforced laws and appropriate penalties that are applied with reasonable
swiftness will lower crime by deterring punished persons from offending
again and deterring would-be offenders from committing new crimes. How
certainly, severely, and swiftly a jurisdiction actually responds to crime
constitutes the objective properties of punishment. 117 For example, if ten of
every one hundred armed robbers are arrested in City X, then the objective
certainty of arrest for armed robbery is 0.10. If the average prison term
imposed by judges for those convicted of armed robbery is seven years,
then one indicator of the objective severity of punishment is seven years in
prison.
A legal jurisdiction can hope to reduce crime by increasing the number
of law enforcement officers on the street, thereby increasing the certainty
with which an offender would be caught for misdeeds. 118 This was the
intention of President Clinton’s effort in 1994 to add 100,000 new police
officers by the year 2000. 119 Increasing the number of police officers on the
street was an attempt to increase the objective certainty of punishment. A
jurisdiction can also attempt to reduce crime by increasing the penalty or
punishment for an act even without affecting its certainty. For example,
many states have passed felony firearm laws that enhance the severity of
punishment for a felony offense if the offender uses or threatens to use a
firearm. 120 The purpose of such laws is to increase the cost of the crime and
deter would-be offenders from using guns when committing crimes.
Of course, even Bentham was aware that the objective properties of
punishment work to inhibit crimes by increasing how the certainty, severity,
116
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and celerity of punishments are perceived by would-be offenders. 121 In
other words, legislators establish and modify the objective properties of
punishment with the expectation that the perceptual properties of
punishment will be affected. The perceptual properties of punishment are
those properties that are thought to exist in a jurisdiction by its population
of offenders and would-be offenders.122 For example, in the hypothetical
jurisdiction above in which ten out of one hundred armed robbers were
arrested, the objective certainty of arrest for armed robbery was 0.10. It
may be, however, that would-be armed robbers think that the probability of
being caught and arrested if they commit armed robbery is much higher
(0.25) or much lower (0.05) than what it actually is. Similarly, a state may
pass a felony firearm law, enhancing the penalty for felonies committed
with a gun, hoping to reduce the proportion of such crimes. The state
would pass such a law with the expectation that the increased punishment
that could be inflicted under the law will be recognized by the public,
including would-be felons.
Deterrence theorists presume that there is a strong positive correlation
between the objective and subjective (perceptual) properties of punishment.
The relationship between these two properties of punishment cannot,
however, be taken for granted. This relationship is first of all empirical,
and the relationship between the two likely falls far short of unity.
Moreover, the subjective properties of punishment are likely affected by
things other than the objective properties of punishment. Since the
objective properties of punishment matter for deterrence theory only to the
extent that the perceptual properties are affected, the magnitude and nature
of the relationship between the objective and perceptual properties of
punishment is an important consideration for deterrence theory and public
policy. 123 At its core, therefore, deterrence theory is a social psychological
theory of threat communication in which the causal chain runs from the
objective properties of punishment through the perceptual properties of
punishment to crime.
The causal process of deterrence is illustrated in Figure 1. The dashed
line connecting the objective properties of punishment to crime indicates
that crime control policies are frequently manipulated to reduce crime and
operate under the assumption that the perceptual properties of punishment
will change as well, without explicit empirical proof that they have
changed. The important conclusion to be drawn from Figure 1 is that in
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Figure 1
Causal Process of Deterrence

order for deterrence to occur, a lot must happen. For an increase in the
number of police officers to affect the crime rate, for example, there must
be a perception among the class of would-be offenders that the certainty of
punishment has increased, and this increase must be connected to their
refraining from crime. Similarly, whether or not the certainty of
enforcement or punishment increases with the use of incarceration, it cannot
have a deterrent effect unless it affects the perceptions of those who are
contemplating offending and those intentions to offend are altered by the
increased risk of sanctions.
From the causal schema in Figure 1, one can deduce some more
precise deterrence hypotheses that can be subject to empirical tests:
H 1 : Other things being equal, there should be an inverse relationship between
the objective properties of punishment (certainty, severity, celerity) and the
crime rate.
H 2 : Other things being equal, there should be a positive relationship between
the objective properties of punishment (certainty, severity, celerity) and the
perceptual properties.
H 3 : Other things being equal, there should be an inverse relationship between
the perceptual properties of punishment (certainty, severity, celerity) and
measures of criminal offending.
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Figure 1 illustrates the causal process assumed by deterrence theory at the
most general level. I use this model as the basic framework for discussing
the empirical literature pertaining to deterrence theory.
The causal process of deterrence is made up of three distinct links.
The first link is that between the objective properties of punishment and
crime rates. It is presumed that the law enforcement and punishment
policies of legal jurisdictions are inversely related to crime levels in those
jurisdictions. 124 If this relationship can be demonstrated empirically, it can
be attributed to a deterrent effect only if: (a) there is a link between criminal
justice practices and perceptions of those practices on the part of offenders
and would-be offenders and (b) the reduction in crime is not due to some
other mechanism (such as the incapacitation of high-rate offenders).
Research on the link between the objective properties of punishment and
crime rates assumes, but does not demonstrate, that the second link—that
between the objective and perceptual properties of punishment—exists. 125
The third link in the process is that between the perceived properties of
punishment and some measure of self-reported offending.
There is a substantial volume of existing research about the possible
deterrent value of various criminal justice policies (policing practices,
sentencing, and prison) and aggregate levels of crime, and between
perceptions of sanction threats and offending at the individual level.126
There is much less research, however, on the relationship between the
objective and perceptual properties of punishment.127
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECTIVE SANCTIONS
AND CRIME RATES
The first hypothesis states that there should be an inverse relationship
between the objective properties of legal sanctions and crime rates. More
specifically, increasing the certainty, severity, and celerity of legal sanctions
should result in lower levels of crime. A very good point to begin this
analysis of deterrence is long-term crime trends in the United States.
Figure 2 shows the rate of property and violent index crimes for the United
States over the period from 1962 to 2008. It reveals that, from the early
1960s until the 1980s, there was a steady increase in both property and
violent index crimes. From the late 1970s until about the mid-1980s, both
rates of crime slightly declined. There followed several years of increases
in crime, particularly for violent index offenses, with both rates reaching
124
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peaks in 1991. After 1991, however, there was a consistent and substantial
decline in the rate of both property and violent crime up to the year 2000—
what has become known as “the great crime drop.” 128 Both property and
violent crime rates continued to decline in the years leading up to 2008, but
at a much slower rate. The decline in crime over the period from 1990 to
2008 was very gradual and consistent, but also remarkable in its cumulative
magnitude. By 2008, the rate of violent crime was down about 66% from
its level in 1992, while the property crime rate had declined by about 53%.
This decline in crime occurred across all regions of the country, in both
urban and rural areas, and for all index crime categories. 129 Quite literally,
the bottom fell out of crime. In trying to account for this dramatic and
long-term decline in crime, it is imperative to examine the criminal justice
system and determine whether changes in deterrence-related policies might
have had a hand creating the decline. A couple of suspects come readily to
mind—the police and the use of imprisonment.

Figure 2
Property and Violent Crime Rate in the United States, 1962-2008

Source: Uniform Crime Reports.
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A. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IN DETERRENCE

In 1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, which initiated many policies aimed at increasing the
deterrent bite of the law, including new firearms restrictions, tougher
sentencing laws, and a plan to put 100,000 new police officers on the
street. 130 There is evidence that, as a result of federal funding, there was a
noticeable increase in the number and per capita rate of police officers in
the United States beginning in the early 1990s. 131 Although it is difficult to
say for sure, one estimate indicated that there was an increase of
approximately 50,000 to 60,000 police officers in the United States (a per
capita expansion of about 14%). 132 The intended effect of putting more
police officers on the streets was to increase the objective probability or
certainty of arrest, with a subsequent deterrent effect on the crime rate. In
addition to a sheer increase in numbers, however, police began
experimenting with more targeted strategies of enforcement in the 1990s.
They started using technology to identify geographic areas of high crime or
“hot spots,” and they engaged in “crackdowns” that targeted particular
kinds of crime, such as drug dealing and weapons offenses, with enhanced
enforcement. 133 It is possible that the rather dramatic decrease in crime
observed in the United States since the 1990s was due to the combination of
more police and better policing.
With respect to the role of the police, many scholars have concluded—
although there is some dispute about this—that at least some of the decline
in crime rates can be attributed to an increase in the number of police and
the increased certainty of punishment associated with that increase. 134 That
an increase in police presence would have the effect of producing some
reduction in crime can be anticipated by previous research that showed a
connection between the two. James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland
conducted one of the first comprehensive studies of the general effect of
police behavior on crime rates. 135 They examined the effect of aggressive
130
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police patrolling practices (having patrol units on the street stopping cars
and issuing moving citations) on robbery rates in thirty-five American
cities. 136 Consistent with the expected deterrent effect of increased police
activity, they found that robbery rates across cities were inversely related to
the arrest ratios for robberies—in cities in which a higher proportion of
robberies resulted in an arrest, the robbery rate was lower.137 In addition,
they found that the arrest ratio for robbery was higher in those cities that
employed more aggressive police patrolling practices.138 The authors
concluded that more police cars out on the street “doing something,” such
as issuing citations, increased their visibility, creating a higher certainty and
severity of punishment (as evidenced by higher arrest ratios), which in turn
is related to lower crime rates. 139
Robert J. Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen replicated Wilson and
Boland’s work in a study of all 171 U.S. cities with populations greater than
100,000 in 1980. 140 Sampson and Cohen examined the relationship
between aggressive policing (defined as the number of arrests per police
officer for disorderly conduct and driving under the influence) and robbery
and burglary rates. Similar to Wilson and Boland, they found that police
aggressiveness was associated with increased levels of arrest certainty for
both robbery and burglary. 141 These two sets of findings suggest that what
the police do can affect the objective certainty of punishment.
Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody and Steven D. Levitt
conducted two additional studies about the deterrent effect of sheer police
presence. In both studies, the researchers examined the relationship
between the number of police officers per capita (in forty-nine U.S. states
and fifty-six large cities during the period from 1973 to 1992 for Marvell
and Moody, and in fifty-nine U.S. cities from 1970 to 1992 for Levitt) and
measures of serious felony crime rates. 142 Consistent with deterrence
theory, Marvell and Moody found a significant inverse relationship between
the number of police officers and state-level homicide, robbery, and
burglary rates. 143 At the city level, a deterrent effect was found for total
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crimes, homicide, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. Moreover, the
magnitude of the effects were non-trivial; they estimated that each
additional police officer resulted in a reduction of about four crimes at the
state level and twenty-four crimes at the city level. 144 Similarly, Levitt
found that an increase in the number of police reduced crime by an average
of approximately 5% to 8% across different crime types—with a greater
effect for violent than property crimes. 145 With a different identification
strategy than that used in his earlier paper, Levitt found, in a city-level data
set which included 122 cities and covered the years from 1975 to 1995, that
the number of police officers reduced both the violent and property crime
rate by approximately 5%. 146
There are, then, empirical grounds for the belief that at least some of
the crime drop since the 1990s was due to the increase in the number of
police officers. New York City experienced the largest drop in crime for
any major U.S. city over this time period, with declines that were about
twice the national average; it also experienced a uniquely dramatic increase
in the number of police officers. 147 Zimring noted that in the ten-year
period from 1990 to 2000, New York City had a 23% increase in the
number of police per 100,000 population, compared with only a 2.6%
increase in police per capita in nine of the other largest U.S. cities. 148 The
New York Police Department (NYPD) also modified its style of policing
during that decade, introducing the COMPSTAT management/organization
system, which promised a more rationally targeted allocation of police
resources. There were other changes to the way the NYPD did its police
work during this period including a “zero tolerance” policy with respect to
minor offending. 149 It was believed that more certain and severe
enforcement of public drunkenness, littering, panhandling, and other public
order laws would have a broader deterrent effect by serving notice that the
police were vigilant about all crime. Given the “stew” of many changes in
policing undergone by the NYPD during that time period, it is exceedingly
difficult to separate any unique sources of deterrence.150 Nevertheless,
there is some evidence that police size and strategy had some deterrent
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impact on crime, although the magnitude of that impact is very difficult to
gauge. 151
In one study, Hope Corman and H. Naci Mocan examined serious
felony crime rates (murder, robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft) in New
York City during the period from 1970 to 1996 and how changes in those
rates reflected changes in the monthly number of arrests and the number of
police officers in the NYPD. 152 Consistent with a deterrent effect, they
found that murders, robberies, burglaries, and thefts of motor vehicles
significantly declined in response to increases in the arrest rate for each
crime, and that robberies and burglaries declined with increases in the
number of police officers. 153 Rosenfeld and his colleagues examined
whether COMPSTAT had an impact on New York City homicide rates over
the 1992-2001 period. 154 They concluded that the decline in both general
homicides and gun-related homicides in New York City did not deviate
from the average decline experienced in other cities, indicating that those
decreases were not likely due to the introduction of COMPSTAT.155
However, they did not analyze whether the general decline in crime in New
York City since 2001 was due to COMPSTAT. 156
A few studies have looked specifically at whether and how much of
the crime decline in the 1990s in the United States could be attributed to
more police officers. These additional hires were due to federal funding
from the 1994 Crime Control Act through the COPS program. 157 Evans and
Owens examined both the hiring of new police officers and the effect of
those newly hired officers on city-level crime rates.158 Using annual data
from 1990 to 2001 from 2,074 cities (each with a population over 10,000),
they found that the more officers that were added to city police
departments, the lower the rates for all seven index offenses.159 The
reduction in crime was statistically significant for auto thefts, burglaries,
robberies, and aggravated assaults and was marginally significant for
murder. 160 Levitt estimated that the COPS program increased the number
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of police officers per capita by 14% during the 1990s.161 He further
estimated that the increase in the number of police during this time period
was responsible for a 5% to 6% reduction in crime, accounting for between
one-fifth and one-tenth of the overall drop in crime. 162
To be fair, not all scholars agree with Levitt’s assessment. John Eck
and Edward Maguire published an extensive review of the existing research
on the relationship between the number of police officers and crime rates
and whether police force size was related to the downturn in crime. 163 Two
interesting things came out of their review. First, they were struck with the
general lack of quality in a great deal of this research. Out of forty-one
studies that they identified as helpful in dealing with the issue, they found
only nine that dealt rigorously enough with methodological problems to
come to a confident conclusion.164 Second, based upon their review of
these nine studies, they concluded that the police had no real effect on the
drop in crime over the 1990s: “[T]he research suggests that hiring more
police officers did not play an independent or consistent role in reducing
violent crime in the United States.” 165
In addition to this research on police presence, a substantial body of
literature examines the deterrent effect of particular police practices on the
crime rate, such as “police crackdowns” on certain kinds of crime or
intensive law enforcement in high-crime areas known as “hot spots.” 166
The idea behind police crackdowns and hot-spot policing is to increase the
certainty of arrest and punishment for particular crimes or particular
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geographic areas with greatly intensified police activity. 167 For example, if
there is a two-block area in a given city in which the crime rate is
particularly high (prostitution, drug sales, robberies), extra police could be
assigned, traffic flow restricted, an on-site booking facility set up, and a
cleaning up of vacant areas and abandoned buildings, all in a concerted
effort to bring additional law enforcement muscle to the area. One would
expect the increased police presence and law enforcement activity to
increase the perception among would-be offenders that the certainty and
severity of sanctions has increased and that, as a result of these changed
perceptions, crime will be deterred.168 Reviews of this literature are more
optimistic than definitive. Many studies are simply too poorly conducted to
draw precise or even realistic assessments about whether the particular
police effort deterred crime. Many studies, in fact, show that even with
massive police effort the return in reduced crime is marginal. 169 At least
some of these studies show that crime is reduced in a given area while the
crack-down or enhanced police presence exists, but that crime quickly
returns to its pre-intervention level soon after the program ends.
Interestingly, these studies frequently show that there is evidence of
crime displacement, whereby crime increases in areas geographically
proximate to the targeted area. 170 What program evaluators must do,
therefore, is balance the deterrent effects achieved in one area with the
crime displacement effects that occur in other areas. Although troubling
from a policy perspective, that criminals simply “move around the corner”
in response to increased police presence to commit crime in another area is
perfectly compatible with (and indeed expected by) deterrence theory and
the belief in a rational offender.171 A reasoning offender would respond to
the increased probability of legal sanctions in one area by relocating to an
area with a lower certainty of apprehension. The rational offender would
then return to his normal “haunts” once the extra police activity brought on
by the crackdown in the original area is removed. 172 Those committing
167
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crimes in the targeted area may rationally reduce their level of offending
until they notice that the risk is either not as great as they thought or police
enforcement has slackened or withdrawn. 173
What can we say about this very copious body of research on both the
number of police and policing styles intended to deter crime?
Unfortunately, nothing precise. It is undoubtedly true that increasing the
number of police officers who patrol an area does lower the amount of
crime in that area, targeted police work with enhanced activity likely lowers
crime, and at least some part of the "great crime drop" can be attributed to
an increase in the number of police officers added to the force as a result of
federal funding. But even these very minimal conclusions must be taken
with a healthy dose of skepticism, and we can say with even less confidence
how much deterrent effect extra police officers and targeted policing have
had.
We should conclude that it is only probably true that added police
contributed to the crime drop for several reasons. First, from 1990 to 2000,
in addition to an increase in the number of police officers in many U.S.
cities, there was also great experimentation with different policing
strategies. It is difficult to disentangle the impact of more police from the
impact of what those police were doing. 174 Second, while it is true that
crime rates dropped while cities were adding more police officers to their
force—including the greatest decline in New York City, which also had the
greatest increase in number of police officers—the relationship between
more police and a reduction in crime is not always clear.175 Figure 3 shows
the percent change in the number of police per 100,000 residents and the
percent change in the rate of violent index crime for a selection of U.S.
cities over the years 1990-2000. While many cities saw an increase in the
number of police and a corresponding reduction in violent crime, this was
not always the case. For example, San Diego experienced approximately a
45% decline in violent crime with only a 1% increase in its police force. 176
Dallas saw more than a 40% reduction in violent crime along with an 8%
reduction in the size of its police force.177 Seattle saw a sizable reduction in
crime (about 44%) with a 9% reduction in its police force. Philadelphia had
a 10% increase in its police per capita but an equally sized increase in
crime. 178 Baltimore had a 20% increase in its police with no discernable
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effect on crime. 179 Clearly, while the number of police can influence the
amount of crime a city experiences, we do not know how much it matters,
and other things seem to matter a great deal as well.

Figure 3
Percent Change 1990-2000 in the Number of Sworn Police and the Violent
Crime Rate (per 100,000)
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Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report. Police Departments in Large Cities,
1990-2000. May 2002. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

New York City did observe the most dramatic decline in it crime rate
of any U.S. city from 1990 to 2000, and it did so while increasing the size
of its police force more than any other city. It also introduced new police
strategies such as COMPSTAT and “zero tolerance” policies. However,
questions have been raised about the veracity of the NYPD’s crime
statistics program under COMPSTAT. 180 A survey given to a group of
more than one hundred retired NYPD captains and higher ranking officers
indicated that they were aware of consistent and non-trivial efforts to
produce lower crime statistics by “down-grading” citizen reports. Downgrading can entail either deliberately not recording certain crimes or putting
179
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pressure on citizens to withdraw their reports. 181 Part of COMPSTAT’s
program was to make individual police precinct commanders responsible
for reductions of crime in their area to the point that people perceived that
careers were at stake if crime did not go down. Many who responded to the
survey complained that city officials put great pressure on individual
precinct commanders to reduce crime by any way possible.182 In the past,
eleven police officials including four precinct commanders were disciplined
by the department for attempting to tamper with crime statistics. 183 In
fairness, it must be mentioned that the COMPSTAT system had been
independently reviewed by the state comptroller and a New York
University professor who both concluded that the NYPD crime data were
accurate and reliable.184 In addition, even conceding that police meddling
with citizen complaints may have occurred, in order to have substantially
contributed to a large share of the crime drop, the “fudging” of police
statistics would have to have been done in virtually every major and midsized U.S. city since the crime drop occurred everywhere.185
There is one other general point to be made here about how much one
can attribute the crime drop in the United States to policies of the criminal
justice system including enhanced police presence. Following Zimring’s
advice that comparisons of U.S. and Canadian crime statistics are
instructive, Figure 4 shows the rate of violent and property crime for
Canada over the years 1962-2008, and Figure 5 shows the homicide rate for
Canada and the United States. 186 Much like the United States, Canada
experienced a rise in crime that peaked in the early 1990s. From 1990 to
2000, Canadian crime rates fell as did those in the United States, though not
by as much for violent crimes. From 1990 to 2000, the Canadian violent
crime rate fell by 10% while its property crime rate fell by 45%. It is
perhaps more instructive to compare particular crime categories for the
United States and Canada (Table 1). With the exception of auto theft, the
general crime drop experienced by Canada is comparable to that found in
the United States. From 1990 to 2000, the homicide rate declined by 39%
in the United States and by 34% in Canada, and the rape rate declined by
22% in both countries. Robberies decreased more in the United States than
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Figure 4
Rate of Violent and Property Crime in Canada, 1962-2008

Source: Canadian Center for Justice Statistics

Figure 5
Homicide Rate in the United States and Canada, 1962-2008

Source: Uniform Crime Reports and Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics.
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Table 1
Changes in Crime in United States and Canada, 1990-2000 187
Homicide
Rape
Aggravated Assault
Robbery
Burglary
Auto Theft
Larceny

United States
-39%
-22%
-24%
-44%
-41%
-37%
-23%

Canada
-34%
-22%
-62%
-13%
-30%
26%
-39%

Canada (-44% compared to -13%), as did burglaries (-41% compared to
-30%), but for both aggravated assault (-24% for the United States and
-62% for Canada) and larcenies (-23% for the United States and -39% for
Canada), the crime drop was greater in Canada. 188
The interesting thing about Figures 4 and 5 and Table 1 is that
Canadian property and violent crime rates fell at about the same time and
level of magnitude and with the same duration as the rates in the United
States, but Canada experienced a 10% decline in the number of police
officers per 100,000 residents from 1990 to 2000. 189 Compare the 19802000 property and violent crime rates for Canada in Figure 4 and the
homicide rate in Figure 5 with the trend in police per 100,000 residents
reported in Figure 6. Crime was declining in Canada at a time when the
number of police officers per capita was also declining, unlike the case for
the United States. It is not likely that an increase in the presence of the
police in the United States had a spill-over effect on Canadian crime rates.
Other more general but not yet identified or understood factors must have
been operating. 190 These data undermine any bold assertion that the great
crime decline in the United States was unequivocally due to the deterrence
provided by more police. While it is likely true that crime came down in the
United States due to more police, it really is not clear at all the extent of
police’s role in deterrence. What we are left with, then, is that clearly
police presence deters crime, but it is probably very difficult to say with any
degree of precision how much it deters. Let us take Levitt’s estimate as a
reasonable guess that increasing the size of the police force by 10% will
reduce crime by about 4% or 5%. 191
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Figure 6
Police per 100,000 population in Canada, 1980-2000

Source: Beattie and Mole, 2007.

B. THE ROLE OF IMPRISONMENT IN DETERRENCE

One of the most substantial punishments that the criminal justice
system has in its arsenal of sanctions is imprisonment. Going to prison is a
costly and painful possible outcome of committing crime. If the deterrence
doctrine is true, there should be an inverse relationship between the use of
imprisonment and crime. For example, the economist Steven Levitt
conducted a very clever and convincing study of the relationship between
imprisonment and crime rates. 192 He was fully aware of the problem of
simultaneity between imprisonment and crime rates (they can mutually
affect each other) and so used prison overcrowding legislation in a state
(court orders to reduce overcrowding) to act as an instrumental variable for
changes in the probability of imprisonment. Court orders to reduce
overcrowding in some state prison systems led to a substantial reduction in
the number of inmates and thus a decline in the probability of a convicted
offender going to prison. 193 Using data that covered the years 1971-1993,
Levitt concluded that likelihood of imprisonment had a non-trivial crime
reduction effect.
He estimated that each additional man-year of
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imprisonment resulted in the reduction of fifteen index crimes. 194 It is not
entirely clear from Levitt’s analysis, however, how much of the crime
avoided was due to deterrence and how much to incapacitation—the fact
that high-rate offenders get locked up and cannot commit crimes. Other
estimates of the effect of prison on crime come from Spelman, who argued
that the “elasticity” of crime with respect to incarceration is between -0.2
and -0.4. 195 “Elasticity” is a statistical way of expressing the effect of a
change in one factor on the change in another. An elasticity of -0.2
indicates that a 10% increase in incarceration would result in a 2% decline
in crime. 196
We can also study the relationship between changes in the rate of
incarceration and crime rates over time to give us some sense as to whether
imprisonment acts as a deterrent to crime. Recall that from the early 1990s
until the present day the crime rate in the United States dramatically
declined. The rate of imprisonment during this same period also increased
rather dramatically, by some 52%. Figure 7 shows the index violent crime
and homicide rates in the United States from 1980 to 2008 along with the
rate of incarceration. It shows that the decline in serious crime and the most
serious crime (homicide) came during a period when the incarceration rate
was doubling. 197 One can look at this figure and be led easily to think that
perhaps some part of the great crime drop was due to the increase in
incarceration.
A great deal of scholarly interest has been directed at trying to
understand the relationship between the great crime drop and the increased
use of imprisonment. There are excellent summaries of this literature
available, 198 and I am again selective here. There is a general consensus
that the decline in crime is, at least in part, due to more and longer prison
sentences, with most of the controversy being over how much of an effect
imprisonment had. After an extensive empirical analysis, Spelman
concluded that between 4% and 21% of the crime drop could be attributed
to the expansion of incarceration. 199 Levitt concluded that the increase in
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Figure 7
Rate of Incarceration, Violent Crime, and Homicide in the United States 1980-2008

Source: Uniform Crime Reports, 2008. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010.

the use of imprisonment from 1990 to 2000 was responsible for about onethird of the declining crime rate.200
In other words, both authors would agree that some part of the decline
in crime since the 1990s was due to the increased use of incarceration in the
United States, and that we can attribute anywhere from 20% to 30% of the
crime drop to imprisonment. As was the case with the role of police
presence in reducing crime, however, I would suggest some caution and
humility in accepting these conclusions. First, it is probably very safe to
say that the threat of imprisonment does indeed act as a general deterrent
and probably is responsible for some share of the recent crime drop. I say
probably and some share because, as with the role of more police, it is
really difficult to make any more definitive conclusions about the deterrent
effect of imprisonment for four reasons.
First, the evidence to date is consistent with the fact that putting more
people in prison can, to some degree, lower the crime rate, but it is not clear
200
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how this crime reduction occurs. Putting more people behind bars can
reduce crime by deterring them but also by incapacitating high-rate
offenders. While it may be true that increased imprisonment does lower
crime, it is far more difficult to say with any authority how much of that
crime reduction is due to deterrence and how much to incapacitation. For
policy purposes, I readily admit that it probably does not make much
difference why crime goes down in response to greater incarceration, but if
one is trying to determine the causal mechanisms behind the decline it
certainly does. Further, one could argue that since both the probability of
imprisonment and the length of imprisonment increased since the 1990s,
both deterrence and incapacitation are equally compelling explanations. 201
Second, any explanation that the crime drop of the 1990s should be
attributed to the increased use of incarceration certainly would have to
explain how that is compatible with the earlier time trend for incarceration
and crime shown in Figure 6. In the decade from the early 1980s to the
early 1990s, the rate of violent crime was rising while the incarceration rate
was doubling. If a greater reliance on incarceration reduces crime by
deterrence (or even incapacitation), why did it take so long to have any
effect on the crime rate?
Third, one also needs to explain why if imprisonment was responsible
for lowering the crime rate in the United States from 1990 to 2000, Canada
had an almost equally impressive decline in crime without a huge expansion
of incarceration like that in the United States? The rate of incarceration in
Canada declined by about 10% from 1993 to 2001, at about the same time
that U.S. rates were doubling, and both countries experienced a substantial
reduction in crime. 202
Fourth, before one can unambiguously conclude that the policies of the
criminal justice system, such as increased incarceration (and increased
police presence), lowered the crime rate through deterrence, one has to be
confident that another link in the deterrence process exists—that between
the objective and perceptual properties of punishment. For something like
increased incarceration or increased law enforcement to have a general
deterrent effect, would-be offenders would have to be aware of the
heightened risk. In the absence of a relationship between the objective and
perceptual properties of punishment, confidence in general deterrence as the
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main causal mechanism responsible for driving down the crime rate would
be shaken. It is to this connection that I turn next.
V. THE LINK BETWEEN THE OBJECTIVE AND PERCEPTUAL
PROPERTIES OF PUNISHMENT
If criminal justice practices, such as enhanced police activity in
particular areas or the increased use of incarceration, have a general
deterrent effect on criminal activity, it must be because there is a causal link
between the objective and perceptual properties of punishment. As Ball
wrote in his paper that appeared in the Journal, the “deterrent effect of a
law obviously depends upon the individual’s knowledge of the law and the
punishment prescribed.” 203 An important component of the deterrence
doctrine, and the criminal justice system itself, is that persons are aware of
actual punishment practices and are aware of changes in those practices
when they occur. This does not mean that the correlation must be unity, but
certainly one should expect to see at least a robust correlation between the
objective and perceptual properties of punishment. Phillip Cook similarly
argued that although the public’s perceptions of sanction threats “are not
accurate, [they] do tend to be systematically related to criminal justice
system activities.” 204 Interestingly, if the correlation is moderate to large,
then aggregate-level studies that relate the objective properties of
punishment to crime rates do provide valid insight into the deterrence
process, but perceptual studies about deterrence were initiated in part
because of skepticism about this causal link. One would also expect that
one’s perceptions of punishment are not immutable but change in response
to changes in objective conditions and changes in that person’s experiences.
In other words, while a person’s current perceptions are certainly related to
some prior set of perceptions, they are nonetheless updated in response to
new information if persons behave rationally.
The expected robust correlation between the objective and perceptual
properties of punishment, and the updating of perceptions in response to
new information about risks and magnitudes of punishments, would seem to
be core assertions at the heart of deterrence theory. There is evidence that
would-be offenders are not completely unmindful of the objective risks and
costs they run if they commit crimes, but the correlations are rather meager
and must be disappointing to believers in deterrence. In fact, one of the
“dirty little secrets” of deterrence is that there really is not much evidence in
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support of a strong correlation between the objective and subjective
properties of punishment. Perhaps the more unfortunate fact is that
although this may be one of the most crucial links in the deterrence process,
it is the one that we know the least about.
What evidence do we have about how would-be offenders perceive
legal sanctions? Two early studies conducted in California lead to the
conclusion that the public does not know very much about the maximum
and minimum punishments provided by law for different offenses, nor is
the public very aware of any changes to those punishments, and inmates of
California prisons were only slightly more informed. 205 Anderson also
found that convicted felons who had been imprisoned were unmindful of
the possible consequences: 18% reported that they no idea what the penalty
would be for their criminal act, and another 35% stated that they didn’t even
consider the possible penalty before committing the crime that got them
into prison. 206 Many ethnographic accounts of offenders also suggest that
in deciding whether or not to commit a crime, the probability of getting
caught and the severity of punishment are not well known. 207
Another thing researchers have discovered is that offenders do not see
increments in punishment in the same way that they are intended to see
them. Because people have what economists call subjective discount rates
(a point that is returned to at the conclusion of this Article), they reduce in
their minds the cost of things that are more distant in time (much like we do
when we reduce the “pain” of buying something by using a credit card
rather than cash). To demonstrate this, Kent A. McClelland and Geoffrey
P. Alpert asked a sample of 152 recently arrested persons to provide
estimates for several different types and levels of legal punishments. 208
Consistent with subjective discounting, they found that a five-year prison
sentence was rated to be only twice as severe as a one year sentence, and a
twenty-year sentence was judged to be just a little more than one-half times
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more severe than a ten-year sentence. 209 In a later study, Eleni Apospori
and Alpert reported that a sample of arrested offenders perceived a ten-year
prison sentence as only four times more severe than a one-year sentence, a
twenty-year sentence only six times more severe, and a twenty-year
sentence was judged to be less than one and one-half times more severe
than a ten-year sentence. 210
There is other evidence to suggest that would-be offenders’
perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment are not strongly
related to the objective properties of punishment and are, therefore, not
likely to be very accurate nor responsive to policy changes. Irving Piliavin
and colleagues found that a measure of the perceived risk of formal
punishment was unrelated to a respondent’s prior arrests and convictions.211
Julie Horney and Ineke Haen Marshall found that the total number of
arrests an individual had accumulated and whether a person had been
arrested for every criminal offense he or she had committed were unrelated
to perceptions of the certainty of arrest.212
Most damaging of all to deterrence theory is a study by Gary Kleck
and colleagues. 213 They interviewed 1,500 adult residents of fifty-four
large urban counties and asked them about their perceptions of the certainty,
severity, and celerity of punishment in their county. 214 An example of a
question about the perceived certainty of punishment measure was: “In the
past 10 years in your county, out of every 100 robberies known to the
police, about how many do you think resulted in the arrest of the
robber?” 215 One measure of perceived severity was: “Out of every 100
persons convicted of robbery in your county, about how many do you think
are given a jail or prison sentence?”216 For the celerity of punishment: “For
persons convicted of robbery, what do you think is the average amount of
time that passes between the day the offender is arrested and the day they
were sentenced in court?” 217 Comparable county-level measures of the
209
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objective levels of the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment in the
county were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and Uniform
Crime Reports. 218 The important question that Kleck and colleagues asked
was whether persons had higher perceptions of the certainty, severity, and
celerity of punishment in counties where the actual levels were higher.
They did not. The correlations between perceived and actual punishment
levels were consistently weak, averaging a Pearson’s correlation of 0.02,
and none was larger than 0.13. 219 At the bivariate level, less than 2% of the
variance in perceived sanction threats was explained by actual levels of
sanctions. 220 This null finding was true when the full sample of respondents
was stratified into those who had at least one prior arrest (the
“experienced”) and those with no prior arrests. 221 In multivariate analysis,
county-level measures of punishment characteristics were unrelated to
individual perceptions of sanction threats.222 This was true for each
different measure of certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment and for
each of four different offenses (homicide, robbery, assault, burglary)
studied. The variance explained in these multivariate models were all very
small, with the largest being 0.08. 223
Lance Lochner argued that a person’s perceptions about the certainty
of arrest should depend upon “an individual’s own (past) criminal behavior
and arrest outcomes, the criminal and arrest outcomes of others around him,
and more general signals that may come from local arrest rates or
neighborhood conditions.” 224 He examined this deterrence hypothesis with
two different data sets—the National Youth Survey (NYS) and the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). 225 Estimating an ordinary least
squares regression model with the perceived probability of arrest for auto
theft in the NLSY97 as the dependent variable, Lochner found that the
objective certainty of punishment as measured by the country-level arrest
rate for auto theft was unrelated to the perceived level of certainty. 226 Even
more disturbing for deterrence theory is the fact that Lochner was only able
to explain 3% of the variance in the perceived certainty of arrest.227 There
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was no measure of the local objective arrest rate in the NYS, but Lochner
found that the perceived probability of arrest was unrelated to the
perception that crime or disorder was a problem within one’s neighborhood.
Like the analysis of the NLSY97 data, the amount of explained variance in
perceptions was very small, from 4% to less than 1%. 228
Horney and Marshall’s, Piliavin et al.’s, Kleck et al.’s, and Lochner’s
studies not only show that there is not a strong relationship between
objective sanctions and perceived sanctions; in none of these were the
researchers able to explain much of the variance in perceived sanction
threats. Piliavin and colleagues explained only 7% of the variance in their
measure of formal sanction risk. 229 In Horney and Marshall’s study, the
explained variance of the perceived risk measures varied by offense but
only ranged from 0.05 to 0.13. 230 Kleck et al.’s study also varied by
offence and only ranged between 4% and 8%.231 Lochner explained only
3% of the variance in his model of perceived punishment.232
This inability to explain much of the variance in perceptions of
sanction threats is another dirty little secret in deterrence research. What
makes this more remarkable is that in each of the studies mentioned above,
the models are fairly well-specified with appropriate right-hand-side
variables that theoretically should matter. In addition, it is not as if
predictions of future states are difficult to explain, as scholars have been
able to better explain other kinds of perceptions, such as perceptions of
college attendance, fertility, smoking, and mortality. 233 We really do not
know very much about how perceptions of punishment are formed, and we
are no better informed than we were when Daniel S. Nagin concluded ten
years ago that “[t]he literature on the formation of sanction risk perception
is small and narrow in scope.” 234 However, it is not only an important
theoretical question about deterrence, but it has critical policy significance.
If perceptions of sanction threats are not directly tied to objective practices
228
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in the criminal justice system, then they will not be responsive to or easily
manipulated by criminal justice policy.
We do not know very much about how perceptions are formed, but, in
a bit of good news for deterrence theory, we do know that once formed
perceptions are modified by experiences, both one’s own experiences and
the experiences of others. This is good news for deterrence theory because
people have shown themselves to be capable Bayesians. Prior perceptions
of the risk of punishment are generally modified downward when people
commit crimes and get away with it—this has been called the “experiential
effect” in the literature. 235 People also generally increase their perceptions
of the risk of punishment when they do get caught. 236 Lochner also found
that, in both the NYS and NLSY97 datasets, there was evidence of updating
of perceptions in response to one’s own behavior—those who committed
crimes and were not arrested had lower perceptions of the certainty of
punishment. 237 What was interesting, however, is that while there was a
significant relationship between arrests for a serious crime and perceived
certainty, it was insignificant when arrest for any offense was used. This
implies that attempts by authorities to crack down on minor crimes in “zero
tolerance” campaigns are not likely to spill over to affect beliefs about the
probability of arrest for more serious crimes. 238
Finally, Shamena Anwar and Thomas A. Loughran estimated a
Bayesian model of perceptual updating on the basis of one’s experience. 239
An important characteristic of their research is that it was conducted with a
high-risk sample of offenders—youth who have been convicted, either in
juvenile or adult court, of a serious felony offense. 240 They too found that
the experience of an arrest increased one’s risk perceptions, although the
magnitude of the effect was rather modest. An individual who committed a
crime and was arrested for it increased his or her perceptions of the
235

Saltzman et al., supra note 98, at 180-84.
See Horney & Marshall, supra note 212, at 584 tbl.2; Lochner, supra note 224, at 454
tbl.5; Matsueda et al., supra note 232, at 111.
237
Contrary evidence was found by Pogarsky and colleagues who reported that those
who had experienced an arrest had lower perceptions of the risk of punishment compared
with those not arrested. They analogized this to the “gambler’s fallacy” whereby once
arrested, offenders think that they are due a streak of good luck before the next arrest. Greg
Pogarsky & Alex R. Piquero, Can Punishment Encourage Offending? Investigating the
‘Resetting’ Effect, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 92 (2003); Greg Pogarsky et al., Modeling
Change in Perceptions about Sanction Threats: The Neglected Linkage in Deterrence
Theory, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 343 (2004).
238
Lochner, supra note 224, at 456 tbl.6 (presenting results for male offenders).
239
Shamena Anwar & Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayseian Learning Theory of
Deterrence among Serious Juvenile Offenders (Apr. 1 2010) (unpublished, on file with
author).
240
Id. at 23.
236

810

RAYMOND PATERNOSTER

[Vol. 100

certainty of punishment by only 5%, compared with those who had not been
arrested. 241 This increase in perceived risk was greater for less experienced
offenders (for whom the information of an arrest would be more novel) than
for the more experienced. 242 Unfortunately for both a more general
deterrent effect and for the deterrent effectiveness of “zero-tolerance”
policing of minor offenses, the effect of an arrest was crime specific.
Getting arrested for a violent crime did not affect one’s perceptions of the
risk for committing a property offense. 243
To summarize, contrary to the deterrence doctrine, subjective
probabilities of punishment held by individuals do not appear to vary
systematically with the actual or objective probabilities. Levitt observed
over ten years ago that “there are a number of obstacles to effective
deterrence. First, criminals may be poorly informed about the likelihood of
detection.” 244 The research to date, though sparse, does suggest that wouldbe offenders are not well-informed about the actual risks of sanctions. Nor
do we know very much about how perceptions are formed. However,
consistent with a rational actor assumption, research has shown that
individuals’ assessments of the risk of being legally sanctioned are affected
by their and others’ experiences with committing crimes with impunity and
with getting arrested. Those individuals who commit crimes and get away
with them, and who know of others who have had the same experiences, are
more likely to lower their estimate of the risk of crime. Individuals who get
arrested do update their perceptions of risk, usually by increasing the
estimate they have about the risk of another arrest (although whether a
gambler’s fallacy exists, and there is a resetting of one’s risk following an
arrest, is yet to be determined). What is troubling is that perceptions of
sanction threats are generally not well explained at all. We know very little
about exactly how perceptions of punishment certainty, severity, and
celerity are formed and this is one of the most glaring holes in the
deterrence literature. Further, while perceptions of sanction threats do
increase in response to an arrest, consistent with the deterrence process,
Anwar and Loughran’s research suggests that this effect is very modest. 245
The fact that perceptions of sanction threats are not strongly related to the
actual levels of punishment does not speak well of the ability of the
criminal justice system to regulate criminal conduct through polices aimed
at making punishment more certain, severe, or swift.
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VI. THE LINK BETWEEN PERCEIVED SANCTION THREATS AND CRIME
The link between perceptions of the certainty, severity, and celerity of
punishment and self-reported involvement in crime has been extremely well
researched, with a line of empirical studies that dates back to the early
1970s. 246 The question that this line of research attempts to address is,
“Whatever the source of individual perceptions of sanction threats, is there
an inverse relationship between perceptions of the certainty, severity, and
celerity of punishment and involvement in crime?” 247 The research in this
area has gone through a number of methodological developments. In the
first stage, respondents were asked about their current perceptions of the
certainty and severity of punishment for certain acts and their previous selfreported involvement in those acts. This line of cross-sectional survey data
consistently revealed that those who perceived the certainty of punishment
to be higher were less likely to report involvement in crime (the results
were not as consistent for perceived severity).248 While these findings were
initially taken as evidence of a deterrent effect for perceived sanction
threats, it became clear that since the self-reported behaviors were lagged
(usually by one year) before the perception measures, the inverse
correlation captured not deterrence but an “experiential effect.” 249 This
experiential effect reflects the fact that those who committed crimes usually
got away with it, and they adjusted their perceptions downward in response
to that new information.250
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The second stage adopted a similar survey methodology but utilized
panel data so that perceived sanction threats were measured before the
incidence of offending—now perceptions were generally lagged by one
year. These studies too showed inverse relationships between perceptions
of certainty and crime (but not generally severity), but they were much
reduced in magnitude from those found in cross-sectional research. 251
Moreover, multivariate models consistently indicated that informal
sanctions were more responsible for inhibiting criminal conduct than the
fear of formal sanctions. Nevertheless, panel survey data did provide some
support for the deterrence doctrine at least with respect to the perceived
certainty of punishment. 252
Three recent examples of the use of survey data to study deterrent
effects on behavior by Ross Matsueda et al., Lochner, and Loughran et al.
are especially informative. Matsueda and colleagues examined the
relationship between the perceived certainty of arrest and subsequent
delinquency using panel data from the Denver Youth Study. 253 Consistent
with deterrence theory, they found that net of other known explanatory
factors, those youth who believed they would be arrested for committing
crime were less likely to report doing it in the subsequent year.254 This
deterrent effect held for both self-reported violent crimes and theft. 255
Consistent with a more general model, they also found that the perceived
benefits of criminal offending comprised an important factor, and the
estimated effect for the perceived costs and benefits of offending were of
roughly the same magnitude. 256 Although they found evidence of deterrent
effects, Matsueda and colleagues were careful in noting that the deterrence
factors were not the most important determinants of crime and that the
modest effects on crime reduction would suggest caution in using the
criminal justice system as the primary tool for compliance:
[G]iven that the United States has one of the highest arrest and imprisonment rates
among Western nations, increasing the perceived probability of arrest by 0.1 would
likely involve draconian steps by the criminal justice system. This implies that
policies for increasing the objective probability of punishment, by themselves, may be
of limited value for reducing the crime rate substantially . . . . Indeed, the modest
explained variance in your models of theft (seven percent) and violence (nine percent)
251
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suggests that other processes, such as socialization and embeddedness in institutions,
may dwarf the effects of punishment and suggest more efficient policy
257
interventions.

Lochner examined deterrent effects in two different data sets, the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) and the National Youth
Survey (NYS), both nationally representative panel data sets. 258 Using an
estimate of the perceived probability of arrest for auto theft in the NLSY97,
Lochner found that it was inversely and significantly related to self-reported
subsequent involvement in auto theft and theft of something worth more
than $50. 259 The effect was not large; a 10% increase in the perceived
probability of arrest was estimated to reduce auto theft by 7% and serious
theft by only 4%. 260 Matsueda cautions that it might take draconian
criminal justice policies to increase the perceived probability of punishment
appreciably. This and the fact that Lochner found that the arrest rate in the
area was unrelated to the individual’s perceptions of the probability of
arrest further limit the public policy implications of these findings. In
addition, recall that in Lochner’s research one measure of the objective
certainty of punishment, the county-level arrest rate, had no deterrent effect
on self-reported auto theft or serious property theft. 261 In the analysis of
NYS data, Lochner estimated the relationship between crime-specific
perceptions about the probability of arrest for two types of theft, breaking
and entering, and attacking someone, on one hand, and self-reported
subsequent involvement in those acts, on the other. 262 All coefficients were
negative, as predicted by deterrence theory, and Lochner estimated that an
increase of ten percentage points in the perceived probability of punishment
reduced involvement in serious thefts by about 3% and auto theft by
about 8%. 263
Loughran and colleagues investigated the functional form of the
deterrence model using data from a sample of juvenile offenders who were
convicted of a serious felony in either juvenile or adult court. 264
Respondents were asked how likely is it that they would be caught and
arrested for the following crimes: fighting, robbery with gun, stabbing
someone, breaking into a store or home, stealing clothes from a store,
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vandalism, and auto theft. 265 They were also asked to self-report the
frequency of their involvement in seventeen different delinquent/criminal
offenses that reflected the offenses in the perceptions questions. 266
Summary scales were created both for the perceived risk of arrest and for
self-reported offending. They found evidence of a non-linear, inverse
relationship between the risk of arrest and offending. 267 Perceptions about
the risk of arrest had no effect on self-reported offending when the
estimated risk was below some tipping point (an estimated probability of
arrest of 0.30). 268 In addition, there was a point of diminishing deterrence
returns at the upper end of the perceived risk of arrest distribution. When
the perceived probability of arrest was within the range from 0.30 to 0.70, a
10% increase of perceived risk was associated with a statistically significant
decrease of more than one half of an offense on average. 269 However, when
the perceived probability of arrest was over 0.70, a 10% increase of
perceived risk was associated with a much smaller decrease of only about
0.159 of an offense on average. 270 Taken together, these results suggest that
the marginal deterrent effect of a change in certainty is substantially
greater—that is, nearly 3.5 times larger—for individuals in the mid-range of
the continuum, as compared to those in the upper ranges. 271 Two important
implications of this are that the observed deterrent effects are very modest
in magnitude, and while sanction threat certainty must be above a certain
threshold to be credible, beyond a certain point it returns a much diminished
deterrent benefit.
In the third stage of perceptual deterrence research, researchers
recognized that perceptions of sanction threats should optimally be
measured at the time that would-be offenders are contemplating committing
a crime. 272 This recognition led to the development of so-called scenario
studies. In this type of research, respondents are provided with a
description of the commission of a crime that is as realistic as possible. For
example, the respondent may be asked to imagine himself in a bar and to
believe that he has had enough alcohol to put himself above the legal limit.
He is told that he could either drive home himself (and thus drive while
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drunk) or get a ride with someone but then be forced to get back to the bar
the next morning the get their car. The respondent typically would then be
asked to estimate the risk of being caught for drunk driving if he was to
drive himself home, estimate the severity of the punishment he would
receive if he was caught, and then estimate the probability that he would
drive home in the described situation. The findings from these scenario
studies consistently show support for deterrence theory, at least with respect
to the perceived certainty of punishment. Those who think they are likely
to get caught are less likely to evade paying their taxes, drive while drunk,
steal things, cheat in school, act in a sexually aggressive manner, act
violently, or engage in various acts of corporate crime. 273
A study by Nagin and Pogarsky is deserving of special scrutiny
because it presents one of the most theoretically sophisticated deterrence
models in the literature and it combines the elements of perceived certainty,
severity, and celerity. 274 Nagin and Pogarsky argue that crime will be
committed when the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs: 275
U(Benefits) > p U(Legal Costs + Extralegal Costs)

(2.1)

Here, the extralegal costs include such things as social censure and selfinflicted guilt, and p is the perceived risk of being sanctioned. This is the
traditional deterrence model in which crime is expected to be reduced when
either the probability of punishment, p, or the perceived severity of legal
punishment (arrest) increases, modified by the inclusion of a parameter that
captures the conceptual spirit of the celerity of punishment. For example, it
is not clear that netting $500 immediately from a theft is exactly offset by
the probability of a $500 fine at sometime in the future. Traditional theory
holds that only if the cost is expected to arrive quickly after the act—
theoretically as quickly as the benefit—is there an offset. Delay makes the
severity of the punishment diminish because it is not immediate and not as
severe. If would-be offenders would prefer to delay their punishment, we
should expect to see a celerity effect. 276
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See Nagin, supra note 77, for a review.
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276
There is no theoretical reason why this has to be true, and Loewenstein has
empirically found evidence for the counter position that persons would prefer to get their
punishment over quickly rather than have it delayed. Loewenstein, supra note 246, at 66768. The idea that punishment which is to be delivered later is actually perceived to be more
painful is consistent with the concept of “dread.” Id. at 667. The notion of dread makes
things conceptually messy for deterrence theory because while there is an empirical basis for
thinking that gains are discounted in the future, we have no knowledge as to whether or not
this is symmetric with respect to losses.
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In response to this, Nagin and Pogarsky add another parameter to
equation 2 above, δ, which is a discount factor that assigns a weight to
future costs. 277 The model becomes:
U(Benefits) > δ t p U(Legal Costs + Extralegal Costs)

(2.2)

Here, the expected legal and extralegal costs of offending are scaled by δ t
and by r, where δ t =1/(1 + r). The extent to which costs are scaled depends
upon how many time periods the legal and extralegal sanctions are delayed,
which is the celerity of punishment, and r, which is the individual’s
discount rate. The discount rate is the extent to which the person reduces
the value of future objects; those with a high discount rate are more
impulsive and less patient (Cook has argued that individual discount rates
may make deterrence through the legal system problematic).278 Notice
what happens to the costs of crime when the discount rate increases from
0.10 to 0.20 (and the delay is equal to one time period). When r=0.10, the
discount factor is equal to 0.91. As Nagin and Pogarsky illustrate, when the
present value of a fine is $1,000, the value delayed by one time period falls
to $909 with a discount fact of 0.91.279 When the discount rate is increased
from 0.10 to 0.20, the discount factor becomes 0.83 and the value of a
$1,000 fine for a more impulsive individual is $833. They also show how
the discount factor provides an operational understanding of the celerity of
punishment. At a fixed level of impulsivity (r), the longer the expected
delay in punishment (or, as t increases) the discount factor also increases.
So if r=0.10 and the delay in punishment is over two periods, then the
discount factor is 0.83 and the present value of a $1,000 fine is $833.
According to this deterrence model, the utility of crime decreases as
legal and extralegal costs increase. The utility of crime also decreases as
the probability of punishment, captured by p, increases. The magnitude by
which punishment produces a disutility is also a function of the value of the
discount factor δ t for each individual—as it decreases the person places less
weight on the cost of future punishment. As can be seen, the value of δ t
declines as t, the time between the act (or celerity), increases.
Although Nagin and Pogarsky did not directly confront this issue,
notice that if George Loewenstein is correct, persons do not view delayed
punishment more favorably but want to get their punishment over as
quickly as possible. 280 If true, then celerity would have an inverse weight,
such that delayed punishment is perceived to be more costly than more
immediate punishment. Whether or not celerity is a positive or negative
277
278
279
280
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weight is one of the interesting issues deterrence researchers need to
address in the future.
Nagin and Pogarsky collected data using a hypothetical drunk driving
scenario and a sample of college students to test their deterrence model. 281
They found that the perceived certainty and severity of legal punishment
had a significant effect on expressed intentions to drive while drunk, but the
perceived celerity of punishment did not. As in virtually every deterrence
study to date, the perceived certainty of punishment was more important
than the perceived severity. The perceived extralegal costs of punishment
(the cost of hiring a lawyer) was at least as good at explaining intentions to
drive drunk as the anticipated fines. The effect of the perceived severity
was far less for those who were more present-oriented than those who were
more future-oriented. Nagin and Pogarsky’s work is important, not only for
putting celerity back on the table for deterrence scholars to debate and
examine, but for getting deterrence theorists to think about the role of stable
individual characteristics, such as one’s discount rate or time orientation, in
the deterrence process.
As well as being one of the most interesting and informative
perceptual deterrence studies, Nagin and Pogarsky’s findings summarize
this entire body of perceptual deterrence literature.282 As seen across a
diverse variety of offenses and with different methodologies (panel survey
and scenarios), the evidence seems to suggest that there is a modest
deterrent effect for the perceived certainty of legal punishment on behavior,
no consistent effect for the perceived severity or celerity of punishment
(though the latter needs additional research), an even stronger effect for the
certainty of non-legal or informal sanctions, and finally, a modest to strong
effect for the perceived benefits or gains from offending. The conclusion
that Nagin came to in his earlier review of the deterrence literature seems
equally accurate today: “[A] consensus has emerged among perceptual
deterrence researchers that the negative association between sanction risk
perceptions and offending behavior or intentions [to offend] is measuring
deterrence.” 283 The dispute may occur over how large the effect is. Other
reviewers of the perceptual deterrence and rational choice literature, for
example, have noted that the magnitude of these observed deterrent effects
have not been particularly large relative to other explanatory factors. Travis
Pratt and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis of the perceptual deterrence
literature and concluded that “the mean effect sizes of the relationships
between crime/deviance and variables specified by deterrence theory are
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modest to negligible.” 284 The safest conclusion from the literature thus far
would be that the perception of certain legal and extralegal sanctions does
seem to act as a modest deterrent factor, but that the perceived severity and
celerity of punishment do not appear to be effective deterrents to crime, and
we know virtually nothing about celerity. The remaining question to be
addressed in the conclusion is why we do not find more dramatic and
impressive deterrent effects. Is it because people are not rational as
deterrence theory requires, or is it that the criminal justice system is not set
up to best exploit that rationality?
VII. CONCLUSION
The remark offered at the beginning of this Article still seems relevant
at the end—the literature seems to suggest that there is a marginal deterrent
effect to some changes in criminal justice policy. It is reasonable to believe
that increasing the number of police officers on the street does deter some
amount of crime, and increasing the risk of incarceration does as well. The
literature on the specific deterrent effect of imprisonment (whether those
who are punished do not return to crime when released) was not reviewed
here, but it has been reviewed elsewhere very recently, and the evidence
does not suggest that either imprisonment itself or the length of
imprisonment is effective in deterring crime for those who experience it.285
There is very little evidence to support the notion that there is a robust
relationship between the objective and perceived properties of punishment,
though offenders do rationally update their risk estimates in response to
their own and others’ experiences.
Finally, while there may be
disagreement about the magnitude, there does seem to be a modest inverse
relationship between the perceived certainty of punishment and crime, but
no real evidence of a deterrent effect for severity, and no real knowledge
base about the celerity of punishment.286
284
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A puzzling question is why deterrent effects reported in the literature
are not stronger. Does it mean that people are not rational and do not
behave rationally? Or does it mean that the criminal justice system might
not be the best place to see deterrent effects given how it the system works?
In other words, perhaps offenders are rational, or at least rational enough to
be effectively deterred by sanction threats, but the criminal justice system is
not capable of exploiting that rationality. 287
The evidence to date with respect to deterrence does speak clearly
about the role of rational choice in criminal offending. It says that while
offenders and would-be offenders may not be perfect Bayesians or perfectly
rational, they certainly are rational in the sense that they respond to
incentives and disincentives. For example, research at the individual-level
shows that people are affected by their perceptions about the risk of getting
caught for misconduct and that these perceptions are sensitive to the
outcomes of behavior. Perceptions of the risks of crime are pushed
downward when people commit crimes and get away with them and are
pushed upward when they get arrested. Policy studies about the policing of
“hot spots” and police “crackdowns” do generally show that there is at least
an initial general deterrent effect in response to the enhanced presence of
the police and police actions, and that offenders rationally readjust their
perceptions of the risk of sanctions and reduce their offending. Or
rationally noticing that enforcement in one area has increased, they “move
around the corner” and commit crimes elsewhere until the “heat is off.”
Evidence of crime displacement, then, while troublesome for policy
evaluations is perfectly consistent, and even expected, under the
assumptions of deterrence and rational choice theory.

involvement in criminal behavior. Randi Hjalmarsson, Crime and Expected Punishment:
Changes in Perception at the Age of Criminal Majority, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 209, 24044 (2009). There is also evidence counter to deterrence theory which fails to show that
permissible concealed gun laws have a negative impact on crime. Jens Ludwig, Gun SelfDefense and Deterrence, in 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 363 (Michael
Tonry ed., 2000). Finally, there is an abundant literature on whether or not the death penalty
is an effective deterrent to homicide with strong statements by some that it is a very effective
deterrent, while others offer compelling grounds to think that it really has no effect. See
generally Ethan Cohen-Cole et al., Model Uncertainty and the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 335 (2009); John J. Donahue & Justin Wolfers,
Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249
(2009); John J. Donahue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58
STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005).
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Even the finding that prison sentences or longer prison sentences do
not deter—and may actually slightly increase the risk of recidivism—is
consistent with a rational choice view of offending. 288 While prison, and
more rather than less prison, may send a deterrent message to would-be
offenders that punishment is credible and severe, it may, in the longer-term,
make it much more difficult for those who have been imprisoned to desist
when they leave the penitentiary. There is an abundant literature that
vividly describes the many and onerous obstacles to employment, housing,
and full civic participation that ex-offenders face upon release from
prison. 289 These obstacles have the effect of decreasing the utility of nonoffending. Confronted by the fact that employment is substantially
impaired because of their criminal record, public housing is restricted, and
other penalties to citizenship exist, crime subsequent to imprisonment may
be the more rational alternative for some past offenders. Much of the
deterrence literature, then, is perfectly consistent with a rational choice
understanding of criminal behavior. But if offenders and would-be
offenders are indeed rational, why are deterrent effects for legal sanctions
so meager in the literature?
The answer to this question must remain speculative at the moment but
it was hinted at very early on in the intellectual history of deterrence theory
and the intellectual history of the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology. 290 Both Bentham and Beccaria argued that in order to be
effective in offsetting the perceived benefits of crime, punishment must
come soon after the offense. Beccaria said it most directly: “The more
promptly and the more closely punishment follows upon the commission of
a crime, the more just and useful it will be.” 291 The reason prompt
punishment is more “useful” is because it is important “that the crime and
the punishment be intimately linked to together, if it be desirable that, in
crude vulgar minds, the seductive picture of a particularly advantageous
crime should immediately call up the associated idea of punishment.” 292
Although both Beccaria and Bentham have been accused of having had
a primitive idea of human learning, they actually had a quite sophisticated
288
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understanding of the limits of criminal deterrence. Beccaria clearly argued
that for a deterrence system to be most effective, the crime should
immediately trigger in the would-be offender’s mind the anticipated
punishment. The benefit of the crime, the “seductive picture” of it, is
immediate and must in turn be countered in the person’s mind by the
comparably immediate anticipation of punishment. Beccaria was fully
aware of the pull of immediate pleasure and that most of us are more
attracted by the immediate benefits of action than we are by the long-term
costs: “[T]he more vulgar [people] are, the more apt they are to act merely
on immediate and familiar associations, ignoring the more remote and
complex ones.” 293 For deterrence to work well, the would-be offender,
tempted by the immediate gains of committing the crime, must be able to
quickly conjure up in her mind the anticipated pain of punishment. To
assist them in that conjuring up of the punishment in their mind, the
criminal justice system must make punishment swift. However, in the
criminal justice system, not only are punishments uncertain, they are far in
the future compared with the benefits of offending. The criminal justice
system, because it has other imperatives (justice must be served and justice
frequently takes time), is not culturally positioned to exploit the rationality
of offenders.
Criminal deterrence may have its limits precisely because the legal
costs are far removed in time and people find it difficult to feel the pain of
the longer-term consequences of their actions. The critic of deterrence von
Hentig referred to the pains of the criminal law as a “long-distance danger”
and noted that “the criminal seems to be in part a human specimen, whose
appetites and desires are irresistibly attracted by a near object.” 294 The
problem of being seduced by “near objects” is perhaps more general than
von Hentig thought. Think for a moment of the predicament of the dieter
tempted by a delicious slice of chocolate cake. The pleasures are powerful
and immediate, and the pain of added pounds is down the road, removed in
time. The cake would be eaten unless this dieter can imagine in their mind
an immediate cost—say the feeling of defeat at breaking her diet or shame
at succumbing to the seduction. In order to offset the immediate pleasure of
eating the chocolate cake, the tempted dieter would have to be able to
perceive an immediate pain of breaking the diet. In a series of absolutely
fascinating research papers, a group of behavioral economists and
psychologists referred to this immediate discomfort or pain as the “pain of
paying.” 295 They specifically ask why people purchase things they clearly
293
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cannot afford, sometimes becoming spendthrifts; the answer, they argue, is
that many of us find it difficult to feel the “pain of paying,” we defer
payment with credit cards or don’t really pay for it by using debit cards. 296
Unable to feel the immediate pain of paying, we buy what we don’t need to
buy, we eat and drink what we shouldn’t eat and drink, and we gamble
when we should save. The “limit[] of deterrence” is that formal legal
sanctions may be too far removed in time to provide that immediate pain of
paying. 297 This was precisely the point made by Jeffery in his Journal
article when he noted that a most unfortunate feature about legal
punishment and criminal behavior, and the reason why criminal sanctions
cannot be relied upon to generate conformity, is that “[t]here are no
aversive stimuli in the environment at that moment.” 298
Without suggesting at all that legal sanctions should be abandoned
because Andenaes was absolutely correct when he asserted that legal
sanctions serve to reinforce our notion of morality, and because there is
evidence of modest marginal deterrent effects of the law, we might take
Beccaria’s advice in the next to the last chapter of On Crimes to heart and
consider that our best effort at securing compliance with rules may come
much earlier in life through education and prevention. 299 Maybe Beccaria
had it right and the answer to America’s crime problem is to be found in the
Emile and not the Panopticon.
Finally, it is also very likely that the distal punishment of the criminal
justice system not only fails to constructively exploit rationality, it does, to
its detriment, effectively exploit a common feature of decision making
under uncertainty—time discounting. As Cook brought up three decades
ago, people have a tendency to “discount” future events. 300 This
discounting would account for the fact that even those who have
experienced punishment, on average, rate a ten-year prison sentence as
much less than twice as severe as a five-year sentence. 301 When we think
we are greatly enhancing deterrent effects by doubling the length of
sentences, then, we likely have a far lessened impact on the offending
calculus of offenders. Time discounting applies to the entire panoply of
sanctions available in the arsenal of the legal system, punishments occur in
the future, and their certainty and severity may be greatly discounted in
making a decision as to whether to commit a crime or not. Whatever
sanctions the criminal justice system may have available for offenders or
296
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300
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would-be offenders, their effectiveness in deterring crime is naturally
diminished by their lack of temporal proximity to the offending decision.
This lends further humility in expecting that the law and legal institutions
can play the most important role in securing compliance to important social
norms.

824

RAYMOND PATERNOSTER

[Vol. 100

